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Statism in a realm of empires 
The neorealist universality claim and the international 
system of the Mediterranean-Ancient Near East in Late 
Antiquity 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Neorealism and the universality claim 
The discipline of international relations was established to describe, explain and 
to some extent predict how political actors, such as individuals, states, organisations 
or multinationals, relate to each other on an international level. While there are many 
different approaches to the subject, few of them boast a historical pedigree as 
impressive as the realist tradition. Tracing back their roots to ancient scholars like 
Thucydides and Machiavelli, realists could convincingly argue that their ideas have 
been around almost as long as politics itself. However, the second half of the twentieth 
century introduced a new interpretation of realism, one that remains at the forefront of 
international relations to this day. Written in 1979, the Theory of International Politics 
by Kenneth Waltz set out to combine the main tenets of what would henceforth be 
known as classical realism, with a scientific methodology. The aim of his novel 
“neorealism” was to introduce a systemic approach that could identify the structural 
factors that mould state-behaviour on an international level. One of the most 
controversial aspects was the additional claim that the application of neorealism was 
not restricted to modern and contemporary history, but could instead be applied 
throughout history.  
 
This claim of universality has been the subject of ample criticism from nearly 
every corner of the academic debate. Neorealists have been accused of historicism 
and statism alike, and their theory deemed a product of the environment in which it 
was conceived, namely the Cold War. Other allegations refer to the fact that 
neorealists assert to have devised a theory that they claim is universally applicable, 
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but have so far failed to support this with convincing case-studies from a historical 
setting preceding the modern Western state-system. Instead, neorealists have 
demonstrated a proclivity to discuss episodes that stem from the 20th and 21st century 
in the West. Earlier cases like the Napoleonic Wars are occasionally included in their 
analyses, but rarely do these venture past the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. As this 
event marks the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of states in international law, its 
status as unofficial benchmark for historical cases ties in with the statist preoccupation 
that neorealists are accused of.   
  
My thesis sets out to deconstruct the universality claim of neorealism, in order 
to understand the motivations behind such a monumental assertion. This will 
subsequently allow me to assess the value of applying the neorealist framework to 
premodern cases. For all of its deficiencies, neorealism has provided a unique and 
enriching insight into the international system that dominated the 20th century, 
including the factors that shaped the World Wars and Cold War. As such, I believe the 
theory deserves to be considered as a viable explanatory tool in universal terms, as it 
was  envisioned by Waltz. This evaluation could not only improve our understanding 
of international relations in a historical setting less familiar to us, but also help in 
bridging the gap between the academic disciplines of IR and history. There are many 
historical subjects that remain woefully underexplored in the IR-discipline, even though 
they might shed a fascinating new light on different types of interstate interactions. As 
a case-study that meets the requirements for what I set out to do in the current 
research, I have opted for the particularly interesting international system of the 
Mediterranean and Ancient Near East in Late Antiquity.1 This period was marked by a 
volatile transition following the collapse of the Roman empire in the 5th century AD, 
after dominating the region for centuries. Its eastern successor, hence known as the 
Byzantine empire, would continue to exist for another thousand years. Only a shadow 
                                                
1 The Mediterranean and Ancient Near East is a common label used by historians of ancient 
history to describe the regions bordering the Mediterranean basin and the modern Middle 
East. See for example chapter 10 in S. Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire, A.D. 
284-641 (Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2015), p. 355; See also map 1.1 and 1.2 in the appendix; 
Late Antiquity refers to the transitionary period between Classical Antiquity and the Middle 
Ages. Brown defines it as the period spanning 200 to 800 A.D. in his influential work on the 
subject. In the current thesis, Late Antiquity refers to the historical period from the 4th to the 7th 
century. in P. Brown, The World of Late Antiquity (London, Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1971), 
Preface.  
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of its former power, the eastern half was still powerful enough to control regional 
politics for another few centuries before being curbed by the expanding power of the 
Arabic peoples from the second half of the 7th century onwards.  
 
While the Germanic kingdoms founded on the remnants of the Western Roman 
empire and the migrating Slavic and Germanic peoples were no match for the power 
of the early Byzantine empire, a wholly different situation arose in the East. Here, a 
nascent Sassanid empire proved to be an opponent that could muster enough power 
to check Byzantine expansion, and at times even threaten its survival. In what was 
essentially a bipolar system, numerous conflicts were fought between the two great 
powers over the centuries, climaxing into what is known the “Last Great War of 
Antiquity” in the early seventh century. This devasting final war would completely 
deplete the resources of both empires, paving the way for the invasions of the Arabic 
peoples that saw the Byzantine empire reduced to its core regions in Anatolia and the 
Balkans, and resulted in the collapse of the Sassanid empire. Therefore, the Last 
Great War will serve as the chronological end point of the historical episode I wish to 
analyse. At a glance, the international system of the Mediterranean - Ancient Near 
East can be considered as a system dominated by two great powers, resembling the 
bipolar environment of the Cold War. Below the surface however, there is much more 
to the behaviour of the entities populating this system that might elude a superficial 
neorealist analysis. What I would therefore like to discuss is whether the nuanced 
nature of their interactions can be understood through a neorealist framework, or 
whether the theory is a child of its environment and indeed too rigidly modern to 
account for international politics prior to the modern Western state-system? That is 
what my thesis sets out to examine, through the following research question: 
 
“What does the application of neorealism to the international system of the 
Mediterranean and the Ancient Near East in Late Antiquity, in particular the 
position of the Byzantine empire, tell us about its universality claim?” 
 
Before proceeding with the thesis, I want to take the time to explain its layout. 
The second half of this chapter consists of an introduction to neorealism as it is 
formulated in Waltz’s seminal Theory of International Politics. The second chapter 
discusses the literature review, in which I discuss a few of the critiques that were 
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levelled against the universality claim, in order to understand how the universal 
applicability of neorealism is perceived by both IR-theorists and historians. Chapter 
three deals with the methodological approach adopted in the thesis. Additionally, I 
introduce historical context of the case, as well as its geographical and chronological 
scope. In chapter four I discuss the universality claim in detail. Chapter five is my case-
study, where I will apply the theoretical framework of neorealism to assess the 
universal explanatory power of the theory. The final chapter is the conclusion, where I 
briefly reiterate the objectives of my thesis, before answering the main research 
question. 
1.2 Theoretical framework of neorealism 
The theory of neorealism is founded on the main premises of classical realism, 
namely an emphasis on the distribution of power in international politics, an anarchic 
international system and the state as the principal actor. The main difference is the 
aspiration of neorealists to approach international politics from a scientific point of 
view, through the identification of structural factors that remain constant throughout 
history.2 In a key departure from classical realist thought, neorealists believe that these 
patterns can be traced back to the nature of the system, rather than a reductionist 
analysis of unit-level attributes. The underlying idea is that if certain outcomes persist 
no matter the historical period or culture, then it makes little sense to seek an 
explanation in the varying nature of unit-level attributes. Instead, they argue, one must 
look for the causes in the system. This does not necessarily mean that Waltz rejects 
the influence of unit-level attributes, just that these can never offer a satisfying 
explanation on their own. Only when the interactions between the system- and unit-
level factors are incorporated in the same theory can one comprehensively understand 
the behaviour of states in an international system.3 So how does the nature of the 
system influence international politics?  
 
Anarchy in international relations refers to an international system without a 
supreme authority that has the power to regulate interactions between states in the 
system or resolve disputes between them. In this environment, states must rely on 
                                                
2 K; Waltz, International Politics (London, Addision-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 66.  
3 Waltz, International Politics, p. 68.  
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their own means to pursue their objectives, the most fundamental of all being survival. 
All other objectives are secondary, and depend on whether or not their survival is 
ensured.4 The opposite of anarchy would be a hierarchical system, which can be found 
in the domestic society. This kind of system precludes the necessity of self-reliance, 
as there is a central authority, the government, which regulates the lower tier 
interactions. Consequently, units tend to specialise their functions, as a hierarchy 
invites them to interact and become interdependent. This is not the case in the 
anarchic international system, where states have to be functionally undifferentiated to 
survive; they cannot depend on others to ensure their survival.5  The standard of 
similarity is set by the great powers, who dominate the course of international politics 
and are the main actors of interest for neorealism. Through the process of socialisation 
units tend to imitate the successful practices or produce a similar kind of attributes of 
the great powers. Constant competition subsequently characterises how states are 
ordered in relation to each other, with great powers being the driving force behind 
changes in the system.6 The result of these processes is the formation of a balance-
of-power, where states seek to accumulate enough power to ensure their own 
preservation, and when achieved, secondary or tertiary objectives. This is done in two 
ways of balancing: internally, states mobilise resources to bolster their own might, 
while externally, they seek to align themselves with allies to reduce the power of a 
common enemy. Neorealism predicts that once the balance-of-power is disrupted, 
states will engage in balancing behaviour to restore it and stem the rise of a potential 
dominating power. This is done in the ways described above, through socialisation, 
competition and internal and external balancing.7 
 
A balance-of-power can result in various types of great power pole distribution. 
Waltz argues that a system dominated by two great powers, i.e. a bipolar system, is 
the most stable prospect. This is specifically the case in comparison to a multipolar 
system, where three or more great powers dictate international politics. The reason is 
that in circumstances of multipolarity, there is more room for alliance-shifting and the 
line between amity and enmity becomes very thin. The uncertainty of the actions of 
                                                
4 Waltz, International Politics, p. 91-92. 
5 Waltz, International Politics, p. 104. 
6 Waltz, International Politics, p. 76.  
7 Waltz, International Politics, p. 118-121.  
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others increases and subsequently, the volatility of the system increases. In a bipolar 
system, both know which state is the main threat to their security, allowing for a sense 
of accommodation and stability. As neither party has to depend on the resources of 
others, a great power only has to look out for its own interests, instead of being goaded 
by other partners in an alliance.8  
 
To summarise the main tenets of Waltz’s neorealism, it helps to use the 
guidance provided by The Logic of Anarchy, a revisionary work of Theory of 
International Politics. The theory in the latter can be convoluted and difficult to follow 
at times, which is why a dedicated chapter with all the information compiled and 
accompanied by useful figures can be invaluable for a full understanding of the 
complexities of the theory.9 Waltz’s neorealism consists of three levels of analysis, 
namely the system, structure and the unit.10 Each one of these levels exerts an 
influence on the behaviour of the state, which can only be understood through their 
inter-level interaction. The impact of the system reveals itself on a structural level, 
which is defined by the ordering principle of the system (anarchy), the functional 
differentiation of the units (undifferentiated) and the distribution of capabilities across 
units (resulting in polarity).11 The third level, which relates to the units, consists of the 
attributes of the unit, as well as the interactions among them.12 The attributes basically 
refer to any type of explanation that is not covered by the system- and structural level, 
and therefore carries less emphasis in Waltz’s work. The only attribute considered part 
of the neorealist framework is related to the structural distribution of capabilities, being 
the amalgamate of “size of population and territory, resource endowment, eco­nomic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence”.13 In order to 
understand the precise nature of the universality claim of neorealism, it is crucial to 
grasp the rigid distinction between the properties of these three levels of analysis, as 
it is often here that confusion occurs in critique directed at neorealism. I now turn to 
                                                
8 Waltz, International Politics, p. 168-170. 
9 See chapter three in B. Buzan, C. Jones and R. Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to 
Structural Realism (New York, Columbia University Press), p. p. 29-65. 
10 Not to be confused with the three levels of analysis in his earlier work, see K. Waltz, Man, 
the State, and War: a theoretical analysis (New York, CUP, 1965).   
11 Buzan, Jones and Little, Logic of Anarchy, p. 36; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 
100-101. 
12 Waltz, International Politics, p. 18.  
13 Waltz, International Politics, p. 131.  
S2070375 
 
13 
 
the chapter that deals with some of these criticisms, in particular those related to the 
university claim made by Waltz.  
Chapter Two: Literature review 
In this chapter I explore the use and criticism of the universalist claim of 
neorealism in the available academic literature. The concept is most prominently 
present in the works of Waltz, who founded the theory of neorealism and perceived its 
application as universal. According to him, the abstract, systemic approach of the 
theory means that it is not bound by historical periods or culture. Since the system 
itself has always remained constant, it is possible to identify the recurring patterns and 
the events that repeat themselves.14 An example would be the phenomenon of wars, 
which have been fought by “(...) tribes, petty principalities, empires, nations, or street 
gangs” alike.15 Since neorealism works towards explaining the factors that lead to 
wars, it does not have to be limited in historical scope. Waltz developed this line of 
thought first in the seminal Theory of International Politics , but has since explored it 
further in later academic articles.16 While being a recognised concept in neorealism, it 
would be an exaggeration to state that all theorists who use the neorealist structural 
framework as a basis, spend an equal amount of effort addressing the universalist 
claim as Waltz does.17  
 
While the universality claim might not be a central component of all the 
neorealist theories, it has been the subject of criticism from various corners in the 
academic debate. Ruggie’s main issue with neorealism is the theory’s inability to 
                                                
14 Waltz, International Politics, p. 66.  
15 Waltz, International Politics, p. 67. 
16 See for example K. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, in: Journal of 
International Affairs (44, 1990), p. 37; K. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, in: 
International Security (25, 2000), p. 39. 
17 A notable exception would be Gilpin, who adopted the structural framework of neorealism, 
but left ample room for classical realist considerations. He stated that: “(..) the fundamental 
nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia. International relations 
continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state 
of anarchy”. In: R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, CUP, 1981), p. 7. 
This claim is far less present in the works of other neorealists, like Stephen Walt and John 
Mearsheimer, who seemed to be much more concerned with policy-making in contemporary 
politics. See: S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (New York, Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 
6, 11-16 and J.J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2001), p. 8.  
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account for one of the most significant systemic changes of the millennium, namely 
the transition from the medieval to the modern international system. Yet rather than 
dismissing the whole premise, he instead suggests the introduction of property rights 
to the unit-level of analysis.18 In his rebuttal, Waltz argues that the inclusion of another 
unit-level feature would unnecessarily open the door to even more specificities, which 
would result in the opposite of what Ruggie intended, namely a theory that does not 
possess the level of abstraction needed to be universally applicable.19 A less 
compromising position is taken by Robert Cox, who laments the “fixed ahistorical view 
of the framework” of neorealism, in contrast to a classical realist analysis that treats 
events in relation to their respective historical context.20 He traces the cause of this 
transformation of realism back to the environment of the Cold War, when a system of 
bipolarity dominated international relations, and an American-led order was 
considered paramount. Consequently, he argues, neorealists tend to use history as a 
trove from which to select cases that prove a superficial recurring pattern. In a similar 
vein to Ruggie’s criticism, Cox also iterates that because of this search for continuity, 
neorealism cannot account for historical changes. 21   
 
A similar criticism is delivered by Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and  Richard 
Little, who wrote Logic of Anarchy in an attempt to revise Waltz’s TIP. The need for a 
revision stems from what they refer to as an unnecessarily narrow approach to theory 
and history. They agree with Ruggie and Cox that neorealism in its current form cannot 
account for historical change and is therefore not universally applicable. However, 
unlike Cox, they value the neorealist framework as a basis that needs to be modified 
in order to accommodate more of history. They label the resulting theory, “structural 
realism”, with a nod to the main difference between classical and neo-realism.22 With 
the purpose of proving the universal applicability of structural realism, Buzan et alii 
opted for premodern cases, mainly on the Greek city-states, the Diadochi and the 
Roman empire. While I strongly support this decision as it fits the aim of my own thesis, 
                                                
18 J.G. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity”, in R. Keohane (ed.), 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 141-143.  
19 K. Waltz, “A Response to my Critics”, in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 328-330. 
20 R. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders”, in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its 
Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 211. 
21 Cox, States and World Orders, p. 211-214. 
22 Buzan, Jones and Little, Logic of Anarchy, p. 10, 25-26. 
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the historical context of their case-studies is not treated with the same meticulousness 
and nuance that characterises the excellent theoretical chapters of LOA. For one, the 
lack of specialised literature on the relevant subject makes me wary of the credibility 
of the historical evidence used to strengthen their claims. For instance, their analysis 
of the poleis-system in Ancient Greece relies on the two most unique, and admittedly 
most famous, poleis of their time: Athens and Sparta.23 The suggestion that these two 
examples can represent the whole of the Ancient Greek world plays into the historian’s 
accusation that an IR-theorist refuses to engage with history in a meaningful way, but 
rather tends to select those cases that fit their framework. I admire the theoretical 
endeavour of Logic of Anarchy, but I do believe that it is possible to make a more 
compelling case-study to convince historians of the potential of IR.  
 
With this in mind, I now turn to the critique levelled at neorealism from the 
historical point of view. This is linked to the latter’s aversion of the perceived superficial 
scrutiny that IR-theorists display vis-à-vis historical cases. A notable example is 
Schroeder, who accuses neorealists of cherry-picking historical cases that fit the 
theory best, leading him to conclude that: “Whether neo-realist theory can be revised 
to apply usefully to all of inter- national history (...) is a question best left to others, or 
at least to another time and place. This essay will close with advising international 
historians not to adopt the neo-realist paradigm, and theorists not to assume that the 
facts of international history support one.”24 A strong judgement indeed, but not a very 
constructive one. It is not particularly difficult to find the holes in a theory, especially 
one that claims to span the whole of human history. What is more challenging is to 
evaluate both its strengths and weaknesses and reach some constructive conclusion 
that could actually help future academics. It seems imprudent to completely dismiss a 
theory that has taken such a leading role in exploring the power relations in the 
twentieth century, admittedly mainly in the West. Especially when these conclusions 
are reached on an insufficient understanding of the theory, leading Waltz to state that 
“(...) Schroeder ignores the basic injunction that theories be judged by what they claim 
to explain.”25 It shows that not only IR-theorists can be guilty of lacking understanding 
                                                
23 Buzan, Jones and Little, Logic of Anarchy, p. 121-127.  
24 P. Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory”, in: International Security (19, 
1994), p. 148. 
25 For the more detailed rebuttal, see K. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories”, in: Realism and 
International Politics (New York, Routledge, 2008), p. 85-86.  
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of history, but likewise that historians can fail to understand the nuances of the political 
theory they want to discuss or use. In recent years an emerging discipline, Historical 
International Relations, sets out to address this gap by trying to incorporate an 
approach that takes into account the historical relativity of concepts that are readily 
used in IR, like for example the idea of the “state”. As such, insights from the historical 
IR discipline are featured in chapter four, where I deconstruct the components of the 
neorealist universality claim.  
 
 While the superficial understanding of history by IR-theorists, and vice versa, is 
gradually being corrected by the efforts of the Historical IR-discipline, it is clear that 
there is still a considerable gap that needs to be addressed when it comes to the study 
of premodern historical cases. This is certainly the case for neorealism, as its 
deceptively easy-to-use emphasis on structural factors can often be a welcome 
addition to historical studies. As such, concepts like balance of power, balancing or 
anarchy periodically emerge outside of its associated framework. In the interest of this 
thesis, I briefly discuss those examples in Byzantine studies. Blockley for one, 
concludes his article on Byzantine-Sassanid monetary diplomacy by acknowledging 
the continuity of its bipolar nature and treating their shared history as a continuous 
process that erupts in the catastrophic Last Great War. Unfortunately, he does not 
explore this idea any further.26 Similarly, and even to a more significant extent, the 
compilation of academic works on Sasanian Persia by Sauer et alii, features a chapter 
with the promising section title of Imperial Power Balances and International Relations. 
Yet here too, the authors fail to really engage with the theoretical framework that gives 
meaning to these concepts: while the balance of power and the shifting dynamics of 
great power relations are briefly mentioned, they limit the subsequent discussion solely 
to the unit-level attribute of the military power of the respective powers involved.27 
 
                                                
26 R.C. Blockley, “Subsidies and Diplomacy: Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity”, in: Phoenix 
(39, 1985), p. 73-74. 
27 E.W. Sauer, J. Nokandeh, K. Pitskhelauri and H.O. Rekavandi, “Innovation and Stagnation: 
Military Infrastructure and the Shifting Balance of Power between Rome and Persia”, in: E.W. 
Sauer (ed.), Sasanian Persia, Between Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia (Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p. 241-267. For other examples of neorealist elements in 
Byzantine studies, see also my article on the rule of emperor Phocas and the events leading 
up to the Last Great War of Antiquity: A. De Vleeschouwer, “The Foreign Policy of Phocas 
(602-610): a Neorealist Reassessment”, in: Byzantion (89, 2019), p. 153-200.  
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Even though this analysis has considerable merit for the study of history, I would 
like to have seen some more consideration of the anarchical / hierarchical nature of 
the system, the functional differentiation of the units or instances of balancing. The 
way these are presented now, is not very useful for the discipline that they wish to 
accommodate, namely international relations. To me, this underscores the need for 
works that establish and evaluate the theoretical neorealist basis before applying its 
concepts to the international system of Late Antiquity.  
Chapter Three: Methodology & methods 
The methodological strategy followed in this thesis is a “theory-testing single 
case-study”. In the Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, this approach is defined as 
“(...) the process of ascertaining whether the empirical evidence in a case or in a 
sample of cases either supports or does not support a given theory”.28 With this 
definition in mind, I set out to test the university claim of neorealism against a case-
study that hails from a historical setting that does not correspond with the more familiar 
environment of neorealist studies, i.e. the twentieth century, or even post the Treaty 
of Westphalia. The theoretical statement at the basis of this methodological approach, 
is usually an “X results in Y”- format, in which X represents a sequence of conditions 
that need to be present for the outcome Y to be made possible.29 The issue with the 
objective of my thesis is that the university claim, in itself, is not a theory; it merely 
refers to the assertion of neorealists that their framework can be universally applied. 
In order to create a viable process that logically determines what needs to be proven, 
it is necessary to establish what exactly constitutes this universality claim. As 
mentioned in the chapter on the theory, Waltz alleges the universality of its theory, 
because it seeks to uncover and explain processes that are primarily structural, 
resulting from the constant anarchic nature of the system. He succinctly summarises 
his position as follows: “Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, 
requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units 
wishing to survive.”30 This is a particularly interesting passage, because it relates to 
                                                
28 T. Hak and J. Dul, “Theory-Testing with Cases”, in: A.J. Mills, G. Durepos and E. Wiebe 
(eds.), Encyclopedia of Case Study Research (2010), p. 937. 
29 Hak and Dul, Theory-Testing, p. 938. 
30 Waltz, International Politics, p. 121.  
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the three levels of analysis that constitute Waltz’s neorealism, namely the system, 
structure and units, while simultaneously explaining what exactly is meant by the 
universality claim. As long as the system is anarchic in nature and the units primarily 
strive for survival, it has to follow that the international politics of the system take place 
in a way that can be explained by neorealism. This in itself already amounts to a 
theoretical statement, in which the X represents the nature of the system and drive of 
the units, and Y balance-of-power politics. It is nevertheless not the statement that I 
want to test, as this already accepts the universality claim and instead looks at the 
theory itself. What I am interested in, is whether those components constituting the 
claim can be applied to my case in question; if this is possible (X), then it follows that 
neorealists can convincingly claim that their theory is universally applicable, not just to 
the historical cases they tend to select (Y).  
 
While process-tracing is central to resolving the question at hand, it can only be 
comprehensively done if equal time is spent on concept-tracing. The first step in 
solving this puzzle is to establish whether the concepts used by neorealists are 
inherent to modern history or if they can also be used to describe pre-modern historical 
processes in a similarly effective way. The concepts in question that I discuss in the 
next chapter are “the international system”, “balance-of-power”, and “the state”. They 
each represent one of the levels of analysis used by Waltz to define the core of 
neorealist thought, respectively, the system-, the structure- and the unit-level. The 
issue with these concepts is that, even though they continue to be the bedrock of 
neorealist theory, and various other IR-schools of thought in general, they are still ill-
defined. As illustrated in the next chapter, the definitions provided by Waltz are 
ambiguous and open to interpretation. In short; their properties are not clearly 
delineated. It is entirely possible that this was his intention, as a clear definition might 
perhaps stifle his claim of universal application. On the other hand, according to 
Berenskoetter, this is not just a deficit in neorealism, as many concepts that are 
ubiquitously used in IR, lack a concrete definition. However, realism and neorealism 
have relied more than any other school of thought on empirical knowledge processed 
from a “sense of history and the experience of politics”.31 This complicates the question 
                                                
31 F. Berenskoetter, “Approaches to Concept Analysis”, in: Millennium, Journal of International 
Studies (45, 2017), p. 155-156.  
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of the universality claim of neorealism, as their historical and political experience is 
mainly related to modern history. Consequently, it is left to me and other theorists to 
trace the meaning and scope of these concepts in order to evaluate if they are 
inherently modern in nature, or open enough to transpose to other periods of history.  
 
Having discussed the process- and concept-tracing approach of my 
methodology, it is now time to turn to the single case that is used in this thesis to test 
the theory. I have opted for a single case instead of multiple cases, because the latter 
would not necessarily result in an added value in this thesis. One well-chosen case 
will give us the same kind of insight into the potential of neorealism to be applied 
universally as multiple could. Even more, the limited format of this thesis allows for 
either one case to be adequately explored, or for multiple to be discussed in a 
superficial fashion. As such, the choice for a single case-study seems logical to me. 
The main criteria for my case-selection are my knowledge and experience on a case, 
as well as its ability to challenge some assertions made in the theory. The choice of 
international system for this case is the region comprising the Mediterranean and 
Ancient Near East, for reasons further discussed in 4.1. In addition, the first criterion 
compels me to choose as a case related to the Byzantine empire in Late Antiquity, a 
culture and period I am acquainted with through former studies. Some knowledge of 
the historical context reveals what could be a very interesting subject for neorealist 
theory: an international system dominated by the bipolar power dynamics of the 
Byzantines and their eastern neighbours, the Sassanids; a weakening former unipolar 
power that attempts to block other entities from becoming too powerful; a wealth of 
(mainly) Byzantine sources that shed light on the diplomatic procedures of the time. 
Even so, as mentioned in the literature review, neorealist analyses have only been 
scantily used in Byzantine studies. The question central to this thesis is whether this 
is solely due to the unfamiliarity of theorists with the subject, or a sign of a more general 
shunning of pre-modern case-studies.  
 
When deciding which episode from Byzantine history lends itself best to theory-
testing, I look for a case that at first sight seems to agree with neorealism, to 
accommodate the theory at least superficially, but also contain certain aspects that 
seem to challenge its premise. For these reasons I have opted to discuss the 
circumstances surrounding the so-called “Eternal Peace Treaty” of 532, between the 
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Byzantine and Sassanid empires. Signed in 532, the agreement ended a five-year 
long war over territory in the Caucasus, but would only last until 540, rendering the 
aspirational name of the treaty rather comical. The eight years of peace did result in 
some level of amiability and even cooperation. I understand that neorealism is most 
effective when applied to longer periods to identify and explain recurring patterns, but 
I argue that the period leading up to, and the consequences of, the peace treaty are 
paradigmatic of the nature of their relationship. On the surface, their behaviour 
resembles that of two great powers vying for regional domination to ensure their own 
survival, and engaging in both internal and external balancing to achieve these goals. 
However, in the three plus centuries of their coexistence, neither succeeded in 
subduing the other  or to even alter the balance of power in a significant way. While it 
might be the case that a constant equality in military strength inhibited them from 
attaining complete domination, other factors shed a different light. Multiple instances 
seem to indicate a relationship that went deeper than just merely power competition; 
the narrative in the sources implying a sense of kinship. While neorealism does not 
necessarily reject temporary alignment of interests, the consistency of the stability of 
their relationship is not easily explained. In addition, the Eternal Peace Treaty further 
demonstrates how the rest of the international system was affected by the exploits of 
the predominant great powers, , resulting in interesting balancing behaviour. More on 
this in the case-study.  
Chapter Four: The deconstruction of the 
universality claim 
The universality claim of Waltz is based on a set of requirements that each correspond 
to a different level of analysis. If these conditions are fulfilled, which neorealists believe 
is the case no matter the historical context, then it follows that their claim is a legitimate 
one. In this chapter, I wish to examine this assertion by using the method of concept-
tracing on its components, these being the international system, the state and balance-
of-power politics. Specifically, I define these concepts in the historical context of the 
Late Antiquity in the Mediterranean and Ancient Near East to understand their 
meaning in an environment that appears to be less familiar to the usual neorealist 
analysis, as well as to pave the way for my case-study in chapter five.  
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4.1 The international system 
One of the main requirements for balance-of-power politics is that the ordering 
principle of the system is anarchic. To Waltz, this is easily enough proven: the only 
way the ordering principle of a system would change from an anarchy to a hierarchy, 
is when one unit would be so overwhelmingly powerful that it controls the system and 
subsequently regulates the interactions of lower-tier units within that system. This can 
never be the case, as the current balance-of-power would prevent such an 
astronomical rise to power and other powers would balance against the potential 
hegemon.32 His conclusion is therefore that anarchy will persist indefinitely and units 
will continue to have to rely on themselves to achieve their objectives. Nothing in his 
work indicates that this position cannot be retroactively applied to past history. On the 
contrary, the following excerpt appears to affirm this belief: “The enduring anarchic 
character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of 
international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent.”33 
As demonstrated by Ruggie in his exposition on the system of feudal Europe in the 
Middle Ages however, this statement has not received academic-wide assent. While 
it is true that certain systems can be labelled as predominantly anarchic or hierarchic, 
in my opinion this is not the first question that should be asked. When looking to apply 
neorealism to pre-modern society, one must instead ask if there can be multiple 
international systems coexisting at the same time and, if so, how does one distinguish 
between them?  
 
Waltz does not offer a clear definition of the international system, at least not in 
empirical terms. Within the theoretical realm, a system is defined by the interaction of 
units.34 This tells us that any environment in which units interact, can be called a 
system. While the open and rather vague definition could accommodate a lot of 
different scenarios, this does not appear to be the interpretation in the remainder of 
Theory of International Politics. When discussing the stable nature of a bipolar system, 
                                                
32 Waltz, International Politics, p. 66, 111.  
33 Waltz, International Politics, p. 66.  
34 Waltz, International Politics, p. 40. 
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Waltz considers the Cold War. This is problematic, as it confers an inherently modern 
outlook to his interpretation. For example, one of the reasons that he claims a bipolar 
world order is the most stable, is because there can be no conflict in the world in which 
either the United States or the Soviet Union are not involved. As such, conflicts are to 
a certain degree regulated by a desire of the great powers to not let them spiral into 
wars with disastrous consequences.35 This implies the potential of both great powers 
to project that power on a global level. That is a far-cry from what would constitute a 
bipolar system in pre-modern times, as great powers did not have access to the 
advanced technology of post-World War II weaponry, and were subsequently 
restricted to their regional theatre. While this does not necessarily render the 
universality claim void, it does raise the question of Waltz’s modern bias. It seems to 
me that one would need to concede that when applying neorealism to premodern 
history, a distinction has to be made between the different international systems that 
coexisted in a global environment. This brings us to the question of how these should 
be demarcated and what the consequences of this would be.  
 
The definition of an international system that makes the most sense to me is 
provided by Bull and Watson, who describe it as “(...) a system, in the sense that the 
behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others”.36 It is an 
appropriate definition for the objective of this thesis, as it is not unnecessarily 
complicated, and accommodates the rationale of balance-of-power politics. Buzan and 
Little point out that the interactions that constitute a system can be divided in four 
sectors, each with a different level of intensity: military, political, economic and socio-
cultural. Deciding on how far an international system extends itself, depends on the 
choice of sector discussed; a system based on the criteria of military-political 
interaction will be much smaller than an economic system, where trade routes vastly 
expand the geographical capacity for interactions.37 Buzan and Little rightly indicate 
that realists are mainly interested in the military-political element of international 
politics, so this will be my main criterion for deciding on an international system that 
captures the international system of the early Byzantine empire. 
                                                
35 Waltz, International Politics, p. 170. 
36 H. Bull and A. Watson, The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1984), p. 1.  
37 B. Buzan and R. Little , International Systems in World History, remaking the study of 
international relations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 92-94.  
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With this in mind, I suggest treating the combined regions of the Mediterranean 
and the Ancient Near East as a single international system, as the Roman empire 
spread out over both of these regions at the height of its power. The political ambitions 
of the early Byzantine empire still covered the whole of the Mediterranean and part of 
the Ancient Near East,  as the successor of Rome and self-proclaimed rightful owner 
of all the former Roman territories,. This deep-rooted belief is often referred to as the 
Orbis Romanus, which will be further discussed in the case-study.38 I am aware that 
this choice of international system is created from the position of the early Byzantine 
empire, as the Sassanid empire operated in a different system, one that extended 
much further to the east. However, it would make little sense to include the outer 
eastern frontiers of the Sassanid realm into the same system, as Bull and Watson’s 
definition would then no longer apply to the Byzantines. Choosing an international 
system is in this capacity is necessarily subjective, and one of the key concessions 
that has to be made in order to accommodate pre-modern history to what appears to 
be an inherently modern outlook of neorealism. The demarcation of an international 
system is conceived in a fluid manner, where entities in one system would be aware 
of the existence of units in other systems, but not to the extent that their actions would 
be incorporated in the former’s calculations. The international system of the early 
Byzantine empire was bordered by entities on the fringes, ranging from the Franks in 
North Europe, to the nomadic peoples and the Turkish Khaganate in the steppes, to 
the peoples inhabiting the Arabian peninsula. While interaction with these entities was 
definitely not as intense as between, for example, the Byzantines and the Sassanids, 
I still include them in the same international system. The reason for this decision is 
that the behaviour of the peoples on the fringes led to balancing acts by the Byzantine 
empire, but any unit beyond these fringes cannot be considered as part of the same 
system due to the lack of interaction that is needed for balancing.  
 
Would this be a satisfying solution to the system-conundrum? Not really, 
because turmoil from outside of the system could still reverberate and have notable 
effects on the units within. As we will see in the section on balance-of-power, it is 
                                                
38 E. Chryos, “Byzantine Diplomacy, AD 300-800: Means and Ends”, in: J. Shepard and S. 
Franklin (eds.), Byzantine Diplomacy (Aldershot, Variorum, 1992), p. 25.  
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particularly difficult to accommodate the nomadic peoples in this understanding of the 
pre-modern world.  It is however the best one can do to reach a resemblance to the 
balance-of-power politics that neorealists seek to explain, in a historical time where 
global awareness was not a given. The second question that needs to be addressed 
is how the creation of these subsystems affect the ordering principles of anarchy and 
hierarchy. Is it possible that the regional limitation of these subsystems can result in a 
predominantly hierarchical order, consequently nullifying the universalist claim of 
neorealism?  
 
According to Waltz, systems are either predominantly anarchical or 
hierarchical, respectively shaping the function and nature of units accordingly. While 
domestic systems are hierarchical, an international system is logically anarchical, as 
it would take one unit to become so inconceivably strong that it can effectively 
transform the system into the former. This statement has come under fire by mainly 
the English School, whose concept of an international society includes a certain 
hierarchy between states that is based on their respective capabilities. Watson 
envisions the nature of an international system as a set of units that fall somewhere 
on the spectrum between absolute independence (anarchy) and absolute empire 
(hierarchy).39 This idea is applied to the international systems of ancient and classical 
history by Buzan and Jones, who argue that the most influential units of the time, 
namely empires, were seen as sources of legitimate rule by other, smaller units in the 
system, making it acceptable for the latter to bandwagon and follow the lead of the 
empires.40 In other words, the domination of imperial rule would have introduced a 
significant element of hierarchy into a pre-modern system. 
  
Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth also subscribe to the idea of a mixed anarchic 
and hierarchic system. According to them, the most emblematic case of an empire that 
absolutely dominated its system, is the Roman empire. Yet they concede that even in 
this case, the system still contained elements of anarchy, as the Pictish and Germanic 
peoples, and the Parthian empire continued to elude the sway of Rome. Their point of 
                                                
39 A. Watson, “Systems of States”, in: Review of International Studies (16, 1990), p. 103-104; 
For an overview of the different degrees of hierarchy, see A. Watson, The Evolution of 
International Society, A Comparative Historical Analysis (London, Routledge, 1992).  
40 Buzan and Little, International Systems, p. 231-232.  
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contention is that this system would therefore be called anarchic by neorealists, 
because there would still be some units in the system seeking self-preservation, 
leading to a balance-of-power. Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth instead argue that it 
would be ridiculous to continue calling this system “simply” anarchic, since an ever-
expanding empire will always encounter other units to balance against until it 
presumably reaches a global extent. They therefore assert that an international system 
dominated for the most part by a single entity should be considered as a hierarchical 
system.41 While I understand their reasoning, I would argue that there is still a 
considerable difference between an anarchic system that is unipolar in its distribution 
of capabilities, and a completely hierarchic system. A hierarchy would mean that a 
central authority controls the interaction of the other units in the system, making any 
need for self-help among the units obsolete; they could instead specialise and become 
interdependent. This was not the case in the international system of the Roman 
empire, where others like the Parthians still managed to survive autonomously. This 
being said, the unipolar Roman system clearly exhibited strong hierarchical elements. 
An example of this would be the Roman interaction with the foederati peoples, who 
became an extension of the empire, while still retaining some degree of autonomy.42  
 
While Waltz does accept the possibility of a mixed systems, he contends that it 
will always be predominantly anarchic and that the hierarchical influence is mainly 
visible on a unit-level of analysis, therefore falling outside of the scope of his theory. 43 
I do not believe this to be true, as my case-study will demonstrate that the presence 
of hierarchical elements also appeared to have influenced the behaviour of the units 
in a pre-modern system. In addition, these  structural consequences were also tied to 
the nature and function of the units, to which I now turn. 
                                                
41 S. Kaufman, Richard Little and W.C. Wohlforth, The Balance of Power in World History (New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 6-7.  
42 Jones defines foederati as follows in his institutional overview of the Roman empire: “(…) 
contingents furnished under treaties by tribes in alliance with the empire and serving under 
their own tribal leaders (…) Such allied tribes could form buffer states against enemies farther 
afield and act as a curb on recalcitrant neighbours on the frontier itself: at the least treaties 
bound them to refrain from raiding the provinces.” in: A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 
284-60: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey, Vol II (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1964), 
p. 611. 
43 Waltz, International Politics, p. 115-116.  
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4.2 The state 
While they are far from the only international actors interacting in an 
international system, states are considered to be the main units of interest in 
neorealism, as they define the structures and create the rules of interaction.44 The 
state has featured prominently as the unit of choice in the discipline of IR. In this 
capacity, it has been treated as an immutable concept that can be traced back 
throughout Western history, most prominently in neorealism. This tendency has been 
challenged by historical IR-theorists, who reject the notion as an ahistoricism. 
Osiander, for example, demonstrates how the idea of the state has evolved drastically 
throughout history, adding that it is impossible to maintain the idea of a universal 
application of neorealism, when failing to recognise the historical relativism of one of 
the key-concepts of the theory.45 In the interest of my thesis, I use this section to 
explore how the theoretically immutable neorealist interpretation of the state contrasts 
with historical reality, and what this means for one of the requirements needed for the 
universality claim, namely the state’s drive for self-preservation.  
 
In Waltz’s approach to international politics, the unit-level of analysis comprises 
the attributes and the interactions between the units. This covers a massive array of 
different factors, ranging from domestic politics, to the type of governance, to the wars 
fought between states. At the same time, the unit-level of analysis barely receives any 
attention in TIP, as neorealists prefer to emphasise structural factors. This leads 
Buzan, Jones and Little to accuse Waltz of ill-defining this level of analysis, using it as 
“a catch-all for everything that falls outside his definition of structure”.46 As a result, the 
concept of the state lacks a clear definition, complicating the task of evaluating its 
historical application. From the structural level of analysis we can infer that Waltz 
considers the units as functionally undifferentiated, performing the same tasks and 
having the same responsibilities as the other units in the system. 47  This refers to the 
process of socialisation as a direct consequence of the anarchic system, where states 
are motivated to follow the most successful practice on the international stage. 
                                                
44 Waltz, International Politics, p.93-94.  
45A. Osiander, Before the State, Systemic Political Change in the West from the Greeks to the 
French Revolution (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 10-11, 495-496. 
46 Buzan, Jones and Little, Logic of Anarchy, p. 47.  
47 Waltz, International Politics, p. 96-97. 
S2070375 
 
27 
 
Additionally, it is clear from the wording in TIP that the functions of a state are tied to 
its rights as a sovereign entity.48 As will become clear from the following discussion, 
this understanding of the state betrays a modern, post-Westphalian outlook on political 
governance.  
 
Gilpin challenges the neorealist notion that history has only known like-units 
coexisting concurrently due to processes of socialisation and competition. Instead, he 
argues that while the state has indeed been the main actor in international interactions 
throughout history, the nature and functions of these states have changed accordingly. 
And as the international system itself is affected by this change, he suggests it is 
instrumental for a historical analysis of international politics to define the attributes of 
the state in relation to the historical period or international system it interacted in.49 
Buzan and Little have likewise identified numerous variations of units throughout 
history, one of them being the empire, a political structure that has persisted 
throughout most of history. While this is the case, its premodern variant did not 
conform to the modern definition of a state: instead, these empires can best be 
portrayed as a set of concentric circles where the inner circle represents the core 
region, and the outer circles merely zones of influence without real borders. The 
subordinate political entities that make up this patchwork, become increasingly more 
autonomous the closer they are situated to the outer frontier.50 An empire’s dominion 
over its territory was not linked to the idea of sovereignty as recorded in the Treaty of 
Westphalia, but rather to the degree of control that the core region could enforce on 
its imperial hinterland.  
 
While this might call into question to what extent an empire could be considered 
a single unit, this is not problematic for the current thesis, as both the Byzantine and 
Sassanid empires were known to be highly centralised units with a high level of 
administrative control over their territories. What I am mostly interested in, is a different 
attribute of empires, which relates to their international status. While the empires 
discussed here were powerful in their own right, they also benefitted from what Buzan 
                                                
48 “To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its 
internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others (…)”, 
in Waltz, International Politics, p. 96. 
49 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 26-27.  
50 Buzan and Little, International Systems, p. 177-178.  
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and Little call “imperial legitimacy”: “Because empires were widely accepted, and 
provided useful services, other units might quite readily bandwagon with a rising 
empire, accepting a vassal status, rather than always resisting it in favour of 
independence.”51 The concept of imperial legitimacy can, in my eyes, be equated to 
what Gilpin calls a hierarchy of prestige. This idea posits that lesser states are more 
willing to follow the basic rules and conventions that have been established by a great 
power. While the prestige is mainly derived from the material power that the latter can 
utilise, it is also because the smaller states accept the legitimacy of the existing order.52  
 
The Byzantines anticipated this reflex quite cunningly: the international system 
that followed the collapse of the Western Roman empire was populated by migrating 
peoples roaming in search of lands to settle; while these had proven to be the downfall 
of much of the Roman empire, their military might could also be used in imperial 
services by drawing the migrating peoples into an order that was centred on, and 
dictated by, Constantinople. An astute example of this practice were the official ranks 
that were granted to the leaders of the migrations, with a matching stipend, to 
effectively manipulate them into doing the imperial bidding. Exploiting the prestige 
afforded by its status in the system was what allowed the Byzantine empire to survive 
for much longer than its military and economic power warranted.53  A similar instance 
of imperial legitimacy transpired on the Byzantine frontier bordering the Arabian 
desert. To counter the raiding parties launched by nomads, Constantinople settled a 
number of nomadic peoples on their own lands. Here too the Arabic foederati, most 
notably the Ghassanids, entered a relationship with the Byzantines in which they 
provided the military support needed to protect the borders against incursions from 
beyond, in exchange for imperial concessions like official positions for the leaders, and 
                                                
51 The complex administration of the early Byzantine empire was able to extract resources to 
an extent that would only be matched by other European states at the end of the Middle Ages. 
For more information, in:  A. E. LaIou, “Writing the Economic History of Byzantium”, in A. E. 
LaIou (ed.), The Economic History of Byzantium, p. 3; Buzan and Little, International Systems, 
p. 231-232. 
52 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 30.  
53 One of the most prominent individuals to hold an imperial rank was Attila, leader of the Huns. 
In A.D. Lee, “Treaty-making in Late Antiquity”, in P. de Souza and J. France (eds.), War and 
Peace in Ancient and Medieval History (Cambridge, CUP, 2008), p. 112; E. Chrysos, 
“Byzantine Diplomacy, AD 300-800: Means and Ends”, in: eds. Shepard (J.) and S. Franklin 
(S.). Byzantine Diplomacy. Aldershot, Variorum, 1992, p. 34-35. 
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legitimacy.54 On the one hand, this materialised into a process of socialisation, where 
numerous settled peoples would take on Roman institutions and customs to reflect the 
successful practice of the Byzantine empire, becoming like units in terms of internal 
attributes.55 At the same time, the level of interdependence grew, as Constantinople 
made use of their military power in exchange for legitimation, grants of land and 
financial aid.56  
 
Another type of unit that refuses to conform to a modern understanding of the 
state, is the nomad. This refers to the pastoral peoples that were either completely 
nomadic or semi-sedentary. Due to the early adoption of horsemanship, their mobility 
allowed them to cover the huge swaths of land that were more difficult to penetrate for 
sedentary civilisations, most notably the steppes. Another consequence of their 
mobility was their military prowess, making them a feared opponent throughout pre-
modern history and threatening the survival of even the most powerful units in the 
system.57 In addition, the mobility of the nomads also meant that they were not bound 
to any territorial confines. As will be discussed in the next section, this complicates our 
understanding of pre-modern balance-of-power politics. The extreme variety between 
the composition of an empire and a nomadic society makes it difficult to argue that an 
anarchic system always comprises functionally undifferentiated units. Instead, it 
appears that it was possible for differentiated units to coexist for an extended period 
without either a need for socialisation or for competition to eliminate the “weaker” form 
of governance. empires and nomads have lived side by side for millennia, and under 
the right circumstances, one proved to be stronger than the other. In conclusion, it 
appears that here too the neorealist understanding of the state suffers from an 
inherently modern outlook. The question now is what this means for balance-of-power 
politics in a pre-modern system, as well as the neorealist universality claim in general.  
                                                
54 A.D. Lee, Information and Frontiers, Roman Foreign Relations in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, 
CUP, 1993), p. 52-53. 
55 The emulation of the state model of the Byzantines by their neighbours is known as imitatio 
imperii, see: Chryos, Byzantine Diplomacy, p. 32-34.  
56 Chrysos, Byzantine Diplomacy, p. 33; The defence of the eastern frontier likewise depended 
largely on the military support provided by allied peoples, mainly the Ghassanids. In: A.D. Lee, 
Information and Frontiers, Roman Foreign Relations in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 52-53. 
57 Buzan and Little, International Systems, p. 185-188.  
S2070375 
 
30 
 
4.3 Balance-of-power politics 
The idea underwriting the universality claim in Waltz’s neorealism is that 
balance-of-power politics will always take place when the international system in 
question is anarchic in nature, and the interacting units seek self-preservation. But 
what exactly are balance-of-power politics? Due to the anarchic nature of the system, 
units will seek to survive by accumulating more power at the expense of another. 
Whenever one or more powers rise to prominence, counteractions are initiated by 
other rivals to prevent this from happening. This is called balancing, and it can be 
pursued both internally and externally. More often than not, balancing behaviour will 
inevitably lead to war, and a new balance will be reached. In summary, the balance-
of-power is the result of the actions of the units to either change or prevent a change 
of their position in an international system. If units would fail to balance against a rising 
great power, world hegemony would be achieved at some point, and the system would 
be transformed into a hierarchy. Instead, anarchy endures and will continue to do so.58 
 
 The previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated that historical reality 
is more complex than this assertion would lead us to believe. The question that is 
addressed here is whether the findings in regards to the system and the units have 
precluded balance-of-power politics from taking place in pre-modern systems, 
specifically in the Mediterranean and Ancient Near East in Late Antiquity. Did 
balancing take place in this system, or was a unit’s rise to power left unchecked by its 
rivals? This is what I will explore in my case-study, based on the conclusions reached 
in the previous sections. Before proceeding to the next chapter however, I wish to 
touch upon some preliminary issues with balance-of-power politics in the historical 
context in question.  
 
 The subjective delineation of an international system has proven to be 
problematic when discussing the nature of its ordering principle. Here too, it 
complicates matters as balance-of-power politics imply a need for awareness of all the 
actors involved, in order to effectively check a rising power. While it is justified to 
cluster a few states together in one system based on the intensity of their military - 
                                                
58 See the theoretical overview in 1.2.  
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political interactions, this often leaves out an entity that proves to be an important factor 
in  changing power balances at a later stage. The unit-type that has historically played 
this role to a devastating effect, are the nomadic peoples. Mobile and adept in 
horsemanship, they often appeared in a regional system without much warning, 
upsetting the entire balance in the process. For this reason, Buzan and Little do not 
consider them to be part of balance-of-power politics, since they do not represent 
power-projections from sedentary states, but are power-projections themselves.59  
 
 In addition, the variety of units populating this system further indicates that 
balance-of-power politics did not follow a similar course as would be expected in a 
modern state-system where functionally undifferentiated units rely on self-help to 
guarantee their survival. The international system of Late Antiquity was one of 
distinctly different kinds of interactions, depending on the type of unit that was involved: 
in the Balkan-provinces, the migratory peoples were drawn into a predominantly 
hierarchical relationship that rested on the imperial legitimacy that the Byzantines used 
as a tool of socialisation and control. In the west, the Germanic kingdoms similarly 
took on a similarly subordinate role when engaging with Constantinople, which will be 
further discussed in my case-study. Meanwhile, the Byzantine-Sassanid relationship 
presented a different image: comprising two like units of equal strength, the Byzantine 
and Sassanid rivalry has some semblance of the bipolar environment of the Cold War.  
Here too, these great powers vied for opportunities to gain power at the expense of 
the other, while simultaneously checking their every move. The next chapter is 
primarily an evaluation of how balance-of-power politics transpired in a bipolar 
international system of mixed anarchic and hierarchic properties, that comprised 
functionally differentiated units. The result is a fascinating insight into pre-modern 
international politics and the importance of legitimacy and prestige. 
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Chapter Five: the Eternal Peace treaty of 532 
5.1 The Sun in the East and the Moon in the West 
Ever since the Sassanid royal house seized the throne of the Parthian empire 
in the third century A.D., relations with the Byzantine empire were characterised by 
numerous major conflicts, interspersed with periods of contentious peace. As the two 
great powers of the region, the Sassanids and Byzantines rivalled each other in terms 
of resources and influence, constantly seeking opportunities to gain territory and 
power at the expense of the other.60 At first sight, this is a dynamic that one would 
expect from a bipolar distribution of power in an anarchic system. It is nonetheless 
only one side of the coin, as is made clear by contemporary sources. The language 
used by statesmen and ambassadors betrays a sense of mutual respect and even an 
acceptance of the other’s existence. The Byzantine chronicler John Malalas relates 
how the accession of Justinian I to the Byzantine throne in 527 was greeted by his 
Sassanid counterpart, who likened their relationship to the one shared by the moon 
and the sun in the same celestial sphere.61 Other instances of kinship between the 
two great powers have been recorded, but particularly interesting are those sources 
that relay a sense of duality in the preservation of order in an otherwise chaotic system. 
In other words, a Byzantine-Sassanid order. This has been conveyed in the most clear 
way by the Sassanid shahanshah Khusro II in 590, when he pleaded the Byzantine 
emperor Maurice to aid him in winning his throne back, after a usurper had seized it: 
“God effected that the whole world should be illumined from the very beginning by two 
eyes, namely by the most powerful kingdom of the Romans and by the most prudent 
sceptre of the Persian state. For by these greatest powers the disobedient and 
bellicose tribes are winnowed and man's course is continually regulated and guided.”62 
He then argues that without his legitimate rule over the Sassanid empire, it would soon 
fall into chaos and therefore be unable to hold the “fierce, malevolent tribes” at bay, 
which would also result in the downfall of the Byzantine empire on the longer term.63 
                                                
60 Blockley, Subsidies and Diplomacy, p. 73.  
61 John Malalas, 449.19-20. in: E. Jeffreys, M. Jeffreys, R. Scott et al. (trs.), The Chronicle of 
John Malalas, A Translation (Melbourne, Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1986). 
62 Theophylact Simocatta, IV.11.1-3, in: M. Whitby and M. Whitby (trs.), The History of 
Theophylact Simocatta (Oxford, OUP, 1986).  
63 Theophylact, IV.11.7.  
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Upon hearing this, the Byzantine emperor agreed to provide Khusro II with the 
necessary troops against the advice of his senate, who had much rather seen the 
rivalling empire fall into disarray. 
 
This is not the only example of an instance in which one party implored the 
other to not seek their destruction, as they needed each other’s existence, and even 
strength, to maintain order in the world.64 While it might be that these were rhetorical 
devices employed in times that one side wanted to secure a beneficial outcome to 
diplomatic talks, the fact is that assertions like these are highly unusual in bipolar 
environments. It is almost unthinkable that the United States would aid the Soviet 
Union in times that the latter was struggling, and vice versa. In a neorealist perception 
of a bipolar world order, the one major threat to one great power is the other. Any 
opportunity that might nullify this threat is eagerly seized upon, as proven by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent incorporation of Eastern European 
states in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. With this in mind, I now examine 
whether the expressed commitments of mutual support in the interest of survival and 
order were merely diplomatic formalities, or whether this sentiment was also reflected 
in the balancing behaviour of the two great powers in question. The chosen case is 
the Eternal Peace treaty of 532, a benchmark in Byzantine-Sassanid relations. 
5.2 The Eternal Peace treaty of 532 
One of the main focal points of the Byzantine-Sassanid competition has always 
been the regions of the Caucasus and Armenia. Both great powers coveted these 
lands that were abundant in gold ore and contained a much-needed reserve of 
manpower to serve in their respective militaries.65 In practice, this meant that these 
regions were subject to frequent shifts in power, with regional subjects moving from 
one sphere of influence to the other, depending on who was winning the current 
conflict. Yet despite the many conquests and raids, some degree of balance always 
returned at the end of the wars, with concessions being made to accommodate the 
                                                
64 For more examples, see M. Whitby, “Byzantine diplomacy: good faith, trust and co-operation 
in international relations in Late Antiquity”, in: P. de Sousa and J. France (eds.), War and 
Peace in Ancient and Medieval History (Cambridge, CUP, 2011), p. 125-128. 
65 B. Dignas and E. Engelbert, Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity, Neighbours and Rivals 
(Cambridge CUP, 2007), p. 174-176.   
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interests of both powers. The awareness of this need for balance is reflected well in 
the actions of Byzantine emperor Tiberius II, who decided to return his recent 
conquests in the region to the Sassanids in order to reach a peace agreement.66  
 
Local disputes in the Armenian and Caucasian region were also the cause for 
war in 526, when the Iberian subjects of the Sassanid empire pleaded the Byzantines 
to intervene, when they were forced to convert to the state-religion of Zoroastrianism. 
The Byzantines seized the opportunity and invaded the Sassanid lands. The following 
war dragged on for many years with both sides conquering and losing territory, until a 
major battle was fought outside of the Byzantine fortress of Dara. This stronghold was 
situated right at the border, and had been a thorn in the sides of the Sassanids ever 
since its foundation at the beginning of the sixth century. When the two armies met 
before its walls in 530, the Sassanids were defeated and forced to initiate peace 
talks.67 While this set of conditions was accepted by Justinian I, the Sassanids were 
no longer interested in peace, possibly because the Byzantines were distracted 
elsewhere by an uprising that demanded their attention and military resources. The 
hostilities were resumed and several more battles were fought in Mesopotamia and 
Armenia. In 532, a new shahanshah had ascended the Sassanid throne, and once 
again peace talks were held.68  
 
The following terms were accepted, as recorded by the Byzantine 
historiographer Procopius: the territorial gains made by both sides in the war had to 
be returned; the Byzantine force at Dara was moved further land inwards so that it was 
no longer considered to be an immediate threat to the Sassanid border; and finally, a 
lump sum of gold was to be paid to contribute to the Sassanid defence of the Caspian 
Gates, i.e. the mountain passes running through the Caucasus and connecting the 
Armenian regions and the northern steppes.69 The Eternal Peace would last until 540, 
when hostilities once more erupted between the two great powers, this time prompted 
                                                
66 Menander Protector, Fragment 20.2, in: R.C. Blockley, The history of Menander the 
Guardsman (Liverpool, Francis Cairns, 1985), p. 187.  
67 S. Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire, AD 284 - 641 (Wiley Blackwell, 2015), p. 
140-141.  
68 G. Greatrex and S.N.C. Lieu, The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars, Part II, 
AD 363-630 (London, Routledge, 2002), p. 91-96.  
69 Procopius, I.22, in: H.B. Dewing (tr.), History of the Wars (London, William Heinemann, 
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by the western expansion of the Byzantine empire, also known as the renovatio 
imperii. What is striking about this war and the peace agreement is that it really 
demonstrates the paradox of enmity and amity in the Byzantine-Sassanid relationship: 
on the one hand we have this clear example of a war fought to check the increasing 
influence of the Byzantines in the region, which is reflected in the demands to return 
all conquests to the former owner. Yet on the other hand, there is the demand of the 
Sassanids to share the burden of the defence of the northern mountain passes, which 
seems like a strange demand to make of one’s arch rival in a system of self-help. The 
next section further explores this aspect of the treaty, which reveals the different layers 
of the Byzantine-Sassanid relationship, reflecting the “us vs. them” mentality in 5.1. 
This is followed by a discussion of the event that caused the breakdown of the treaty 
in 532, namely the renovatio imperii. While on the one hand confirming the neorealist 
motivations behind the war initiated in 540 by the Sassanids, it also provides a deeper 
insight into the broader international politics of the Mediterranean - Ancient Near 
Eastern system in Late Antiquity, and the importance of imperial legitimacy therein. 
5.3 The defence of the Caspian Gates 
The Sassanid demand to contribute to the defence of the passages running 
through the Caucasian mountain ranges was not a new one. It was first discussed in 
363, but since the Byzantines could not spare the military resources at the time, the 
Sassanids were the ones to build the fortresses and garrison them with troops.70 From 
that point onwards, the maintenance of the Caspian Gates would become a point of 
contention in their relations. On numerous occasions the issue was brought up in 
diplomatic talks, mainly by the Sassanids, who were bearing the brunt of guarding the 
mountain passes. The Byzantines did pay for it at times, but it was done in an irregular 
manner: at least once it took the form of a yearly subsidy, but more often it was a lump 
sum that was agreed upon in order to end a conflict.71 On one such occasion, the 
Sassanids demanded that the former would either contribute financially or supply men 
                                                
70 Blockley, Subsidies and Diplomacy, p. 63-65.  
71 On other occasions, the Byzantines contributed lump sums of gold to the defense of the 
Caspian Gates, usually as part of a treaty concluding a war. See P. Spring, Great Walls and 
Linear Barriers (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Military, 2015), p. 199-200. 
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to help garrison one of their fortresses.72 It is remarkable that, in a bipolar system, one 
great power would go as far as to invite the other to station troops on its territory, and 
even express an explicit desire to do so. It is strange that two rivals would share 
something as essential to their security as defense. For example, it is rather 
inconceivable that the United States would make a similar demand to the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, as keeping the opposition’s military out of one’s territory was 
considered to be an objective of vital state-interest. But once again, the limitations of 
a pre-modern international system affect the balancing: while the United States and 
the Soviet Union were aware of their global surroundings and could be certain that 
there was no unknown factor lurking beyond the system to topple their power, and as 
such only had to fear each other, this was not the case in Late Antiquity. Here, 
information on the wider global environment was limited, and the threat of an 
unexpected invasion of “barbarians” was real and feared.  
 
The latter are mentioned in the sources under names like the Massagetae, 
Huns or Scythians, which all refer to the patchwork of nomadic peoples roaming the 
Eurasian steppes in Late Antiquity. Their mobility made them unpredictable foes, and 
their military prowess a threat to the survival of sedentary empires. The Byzantines 
had experienced this danger in the form of Attila, who swept through Eastern and 
Central Europe in the fifth century and established an empire that imploded after his 
death. The Sassanids would briefly be subjugated a century later at the hands of the 
Hunnic Hephthalites. It would therefore be an understatement to claim that both 
empires were well-aware of the threat that nomadic peoples could pose. So could the 
defence of the Caspian Gates be explained in neorealist terms as an alignment of the 
interests of the Byzantines and the Sassanids to balance against a third great power, 
namely the nomads? Perhaps, but only on a very superficial level: when Waltz refers 
to external balancing, this is meant as a temporary manoeuvre against a real and 
immediate threat. It is unheard of that this arrangement would span centuries, as it did 
with the Byzantines and the Sassanids. Secondly, the enemy they balanced against 
was not one entity, but rather the idea of “barbarians”. During most of the period I am 
discussing, the nomads comprised different peoples with their own interactions and 
                                                
72 The fortress Virapakh had been founded by the Sassanids in 363. See: Blockley, Subsidies 
and Diplomacy, p. 64-66.  
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behaviour. For these reasons, it is difficult to treat the nomads as one entity and 
incorporate them as such into the balance-of-power politics of the international system 
of Late Antiquity. Balancing was done to some extent in regards to some of the 
nomadic peoples, but the defence of the Caspian Gates was not established for this 
reason. Instead, it was another example of the Byzantine-Sassanid outlook on the 
world, which posits them as the keepers of order vis-à-vis the “barbarians”.  
 
The result appears to be that their balancing against the nomads of the 
Eurasian steppes overrode any individual interests that either great power might have 
had. With this in mind, let us return to the conditions set out by the Sassanids prior to 
conclusion of the Eternal Peace treaty in 532. During the negotiations, their diplomat 
remarked that Kavad I, the Sassanid shahanshah at the time, had expressed his 
displeasure with the Byzantines, because the latter had not contributed to the 
maintenance of the fortifications at the Caspian Gates. He added that were it not for 
the Sassanids guarding these passages, the “barbarians” would have come south and 
ravaged the lands of the empires. Due to the failure to adhere to a past agreement to 
share the burden, the Sassanids now found themselves at a disadvantage. Not only 
were they forced to keep a considerable force at the Caspian Gates, they also had to 
refurbish another army to protect their borders from the Byzantines garrisoned at Dara. 
Because of this injustice, the Sassanids demanded that they would either contribute 
to their garrison up north or dismantle to fortress of Dara, while emphasising that the 
former would be preferable.73 This is very peculiar demand, considering that they could 
also have demanded both of those things, in order to guarantee a stable and lasting 
peace. Yet, this does offer some additional insight into the Byzantine-Sassanid 
relationship: it appears that the condition of war between the two great powers was 
accepted as something inevitable and even “normal”. That is, as long as it was fought 
on equal terms and if some kind of agreement was afterwards concluded that 
accommodated both sides to some extent. If this were not the case, a neorealist 
approach might expect that the Sassanids would reach out to nomadic peoples to 
balance against the expanding Byzantine influence in the region, as curtailing it would 
benefit all regional powers. Instead, the Sassanids confronted the Byzantines on their 
own, as they had done so many times before, and demanded that the war was fought 
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on equal terms, while reminding the latter of the responsibility they shared to keep out 
the “barbarians”. Whitby also commented on this unique aspect of their relationship, 
noting that: “The ability of the two empires to specify the permitted arena for warfare 
reflects the maturity of their relations (...)”.74 
 
 More than just an remarkable aspect of their relationship, the shared fear of the 
nomadic powers appears to have been a cornerstone of the Byzantine-Sassanid 
interactions. The distinction in the way the imperial powers regarded themselves and 
the “barbarians” surrounding them, eschewed their balancing behaviour in favour of 
the preservation of an imperial order in the system. It is further interesting to note that, 
once the moderation in the Byzantine-Sassanid rivalry was breached in the 
devastating Last Great War of Antiquity, it would not take half a century before the 
Arabic nomadic peoples overran nearly the entire Ancient Near East. The next and 
final section of this thesis deals with the interactions of the Byzantine empire with a 
different sort of “barbarian”, namely the Germanic kingdoms that had been founded 
on the remains of the Western Roman empire. While being more acknowledged than 
the nomadic peoples, here too we will see how international status affected balancing 
behaviour.  
5.4 The renovatio imperii 
The idea behind the renovatio imperii is related to the Byzantine ideology of the 
Orbis Romanus, namely the idea that the former Roman lands still belonged to their 
Byzantine successors, even if these were currently occupied by Germanic kingdoms. 
Consequently, the latter were merely considered as subjects to the imperial crown, 
expected to follow and obey the Byzantine order imposed on the region.75 Under rule 
of the emperor Justinian I in the sixth century, this ideology was translated into a series 
of conquests aimed to wrest control from the Germanic peoples and to effectively re-
establish Byzantine control over the Mediterranean. The Eternal Peace treaty marked 
the beginning of this massive westwards expansion, as the peace with the Sassanids 
freed up substantial military resources that were previously tied up in the conflicts on 
the eastern frontier.  
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The first thing that has to be examined is how the Germanic kingdoms 
considered their own place in a Byzantine-dominated Orbis Romanus. There were 
three main successor-states that had formed along the Mediterranean in the wake of 
the collapse of the Western Roman empire and interacted with the Byzantines on a 
regular basis: the Ostrogoths in Dalmatia and Italy; the Visigoths in what is now the 
south of France and the coast of Spain; and finally, the Vandals in Northern Africa.76 
As mentioned before, the Byzantines actively encouraged their foederati to take on 
Roman customs and institutions, in order to draw them into an international system 
that played by their rules. This appears to have been a successful strategy, even with 
the successor-states, which were nominally autonomous entities. Contemporary 
correspondence between members of the Germanic royal houses and the imperial 
court indicate an obedience expressed by the former, introducing themselves as 
delegates of Constantinople, instead of rulers of an independent kingdom.77 It is clear 
that the relations between units as distinctly different as empire and kingdom 
contained strong elements of a hierarchy, at the very least in their communication. The 
renovatio imperii further demonstrates how this also had a profound impact on 
balancing behaviour in a pre-modern international system. 
 
The Vandal, Visigothic and Ostrogothic kingdoms comprised most of the 
western basin of the Mediterranean and were allied by way of marriages. While they 
did position themselves as subservient to the emperor in the east, that did not mean 
that the Byzantines were happy to allow these new powers to burgeon on previously 
Roman-owned lands. In the wake of the treaty of 532, Justinian I had the chance to 
intervene in the Vandal kingdom in Northern Africa, when the local king was deposed 
by a pretender, named Gelimer. Under the pretext of supporting the deposed ruler, the 
Byzantines dispatched a relatively small force that conquered the region by 535. 
Around the same time, in the Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy, a similar scenario took 
place: the ruler by the name of Amalasuentha had been likewise murdered by a 
                                                
76 See map 2 in the appendix. 
77 G. Scheibelreiter, “Vester est populus meus, Byzantinische Reichsideologie und 
germanisches Selbstverständnis”, in: E; Chrysos and A. Schwarcz (eds.), Das Reich und die 
Barbaren (Vienna, Böhlau Verlag, 1989), p. 207; J. Moorhead, “The Byzantines in the West in 
the sixth century”, in: P. Fouracre (ed.), The New Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge, 
CUP, 2005), p. 119.  
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pretender who had taken the throne for himself. This provided a casus belli to the 
Byzantines, one that was further supplemented by the allegation that Italy did not 
belong to the Ostrogoths, but should have been returned to the imperial crown. After 
all, the Ostrogoths had initially been sent by Constantinople to expel the previous 
Germanic ruler.78 The Gothic war lasted much longer than the Vandal campaign and 
ravaged most of Italy, but by 565 the Byzantines could once more call themselves 
rulers over the heartland of the Roman empire. Finally, a third campaign was initiated 
in 552, when a small Byzantine force was sent to conquer the coastal region of Spain, 
when a Visigothic rebel reached out and appealed for an intervention against the 
kingdom.79 This concluded the series of conquests that once more transformed the 
Mediterranean into a Mare Nostrum.80  
 
An interesting observation on the course of the renovation imperii is voiced by 
Moorhead, who notes how puzzling it is that none of the Germanic kingdoms seem to 
have aided each other when the Byzantines invaded, in spite of their mutual 
alliances.81 Instead of balancing together against the expanding power of 
Constantinople over the Mediterranean, each of the kingdoms appeared to have faced 
the Byzantines on its own, and were subsequently defeated by the latter’s superior 
military. Two remarks can be made in this regards: for one, the Visigoths did send a 
forces to Northern Africa, but this was in 544, nine years after the Vandals had been 
defeated. While it may not have been an attempt to aid their former allies, it is possible 
that this invasion prompted a Byzantine response in 552, when they landed in Spain. 
Secondly, when the Byzantines invaded Italy, the Ostrogoths reached out to the 
Sassanids to persuade them to break the treaty of 532 and declare war on their rivals. 
According to Procopius, the Ostrogothic diplomats argued that it would be in the best 
interests of both parties to combine their forces to check the Byzantine expansion, 
before the latter would become so powerful that even the Sassanids would not stand 
a chance in future conflicts.82 This account confirms that attempts at balancing did take 
place, and quite successfully so: the Sassanids broke the Eternal Peace treaty in 540, 
                                                
78 F. Wozniak, “East Rome, Ravenna and Western Illyricum: 454-536 A.D.”, in: Historia: 
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79 For the full overview of the campaigns, see: Moorhead, Byzantines in the West, p. 123-129.  
80 See map 3 in the appendix. 
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ravaged the Byzantine provinces in the Near East, before eventually being countered 
by forces transferred back from the Byzantine campaign in the West.83 Their 
intervention in the east had managed to prolong the conquest of Italy, but eventually 
the Ostrogoths were subdued.  
 
Just like the defence of the Caspian Gates, the renovatio imperii likewise 
sketches a nuanced picture of balancing behaviour in Late Antiquity. A clear example 
of balancing took place when the Sassanids decided to intervene on behalf of the 
Ostrogoths, in order to restore the balance of power with the Byzantines. On the other 
hand, it is worth noting how no coalition was formed among the parties whose interests 
seemed to be aligned the most, namely the Germanic kingdoms in the west. I argue 
that this inaction can once more be traced back to the hierarchical elements in the 
system, and the status of an imperial power like the Byzantine empire. Even though 
the Vandal, Visigothic and Ostrogothic kingdoms were autonomous entities, the 
legitimacy conferred upon them by the nominal support of the imperial crown meant 
that it would be in their best interest to bandwagon Constantinople. When their survival 
was no longer in the interest of the Byzantine empire, i.e. when the latter had freed up 
enough resources to establish its hegemony over the region once more, 
bandwagoning became an unsustainable reaction that resulted in heavy losses. 
Another consequence of the partially hierarchical relationship crystallised in the 
domestic realm: due to the position of authority held by  the Byzantine empire in the 
international system, a convenient casus belli could be found in the deposition or 
assassination of characters close to the imperial crown, as well as a right to intervene 
in domestic politics when appealed to. While this does not necessarily go against 
neorealist thought, it does show how misplaced the concepts of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are in a realm of empires. Only once the Germanic kingdoms grew 
more accustomed to their autonomy and became more powerful towards the end of 
the sixth century, did they begin to reject a Byzantine-dominated Orbis Romanus.84  
                                                
83 Greatrex, The Roman Eastern Frontier, p. 106-111; For a comprehensive discussion of the 
motivations of the Sassanids to break the Eternal Treaty of 532, see: H. Börm, “Der 
Perserkönig im Imperium Romanum, Chosroes I und der sasanidische Einfall in das 
Oströmische Reich 540 n. Chr.”, in: Chiron (36, 2006), p. 299-328.   
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
In writing this thesis, I had the intent to challenge neorealists on their assertion 
that neorealism could be applied throughout history to explain certain aspects of 
international politics, in particular the behaviour of the states. This included a 
deconstructive analysis of the different components constituting this universality claim 
to reflect the historical reality of my case, followed by the case-study itself. So in light 
of my findings, what does the application of neorealism to the international system of 
the Mediterranean and Ancient Near East in Late Antiquity tell us about its universality 
claim?  
 
Based on the difficulty with which the neorealist framework was adapted to fit a 
pre-modern application, one might conclude that academic suspicions towards such a 
grandiose statement was justified, and that neorealism has no place outside of modern 
politics. I would not go that far. Certainly, it has become clear that the framework and 
concepts used in neorealism are irrefutably modern, and that many issues arise when 
this is transposed to a different era where the same concepts struggle to find meaning. 
In addition, my case-study has demonstrated that pre-modern international politics 
were more nuanced than a neorealist theory can account for. Yet, we cannot allow 
ourselves to fall for the same pitfall besetting other critics who failed to understand the 
exact nature of Waltz’s universality claim. Neorealism has never been about 
comprehensively capturing the nuances of international politics. In the words of Waltz: 
“Structures never tell us all that we want to know. Instead they tell us a small number 
of big and important things. They focus our attention on those components and forces 
that usually continue for long periods".85 
 
 These “things” can be summarised by the set of conditions that has been the 
guiding theme throughout this thesis, namely that “(…) balance-of-power politics 
prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic 
and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”86 Being the essence of the 
universality claim, the only question of importance in this thesis is whether this 
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sequence holds up in the distinctly different environment of Late Antiquity. With the 
premise of neorealism in mind, the answer would be a superficial yes: the Ancient 
Near East and Mediterranean were part of an international system that was bipolarly 
dominated by two great powers, surrounded by minor units that for the most part 
followed their lead. As such, the great powers engaged in balancing behaviour to keep 
the other from expanding its power and influence. There was no authority above them 
that regulated their behaviour, prompting both to think in terms of their own survival.  
 
 Does it matter then that within these patterns aberrations are noticeable in 
regards to the additional layers of kinship and a fear of the “barbarians” in the 
Byzantine-Sassanid relationship? It does and it does not; this depends on how 
descriptive one wants a theory of explanation to be. Neorealism can tell us that in an 
anarchic system great powers will generally balance against each other, no matter the 
historical period. This much appears to be true. Yet if one wanted to take a closer look 
at the international politics of a certain historical period, then this theory will fall short 
of providing a satisfying explanation. As such, it is unable to account for the fact that 
the Byzantines and Sassanids shared a century-long mutual defence in the Caucasus, 
which completely goes against the idea of self-help and autonomy. In the same way, 
it cannot convincingly argue why the semi-powerful Germanic kingdoms would fail to 
balance against the expanding Byzantine influence in the Mediterranean, but rather 
appealed to the only other empire to intervene in the conflict. As a result, the Byzantine 
empire was able to dispatch a relatively low number of troops to conquer a 
disproportionately large area across the Mediterranean. Neorealism cannot explain 
this, because it does not take into account concepts like prestige or imperial legitimacy. 
These are all relegated to the catch-all that is the additional unit-level of analysis, which 
falls outside of its scope.  
 
 This brings me to the main issue with neorealism and its historical appliance. It 
is my belief that a neorealist explanation of pre-modern international politics would 
benefit immensely from the acknowledgement of a strong hierarchical element in the 
international system, and its considerable impact on the behaviour of the units. The 
reason behind this is that I am convinced that the causes for many of the previously 
discussed anomalies can be found in the nature of the system, which would negate 
the need to refer these issues to an additional theory on the unit-level of analysis. 
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Therefore, it seems unnecessarily obdurate to ignore any nuance in the ordering 
principle of the system, especially when this is the aspect that distinguishes 
neorealism the most from other political theories. I do not argue that the international 
system in question was predominantly hierarchical, as this would undermine the 
universality claim, but merely that there is no conceivable reason to outrightly reject 
the presence and consequences of a hierarchical component. On the contrary, the 
inclusion of varying degrees of hierarchy might even account for change in 
international politics, which would address one of neorealism’s harshest returning 
criticisms. With this belief, I align myself with Buzan, Little and Richards, who hoped 
to reach more with the theory, “(…) without compromising the basic distinction 
between structure and unit levels”.87 
 
 The final thing that I would like to touch on before finishing this thesis, is the 
limitations of its format. I am not under the illusion that I have treated the historical 
context of my case-study with the scrutiny, and eye for attention and detail that it 
deserves. Only an academic work at least ten times the size of this thesis could do a 
subject of this extent justice. While I have barely scratched the surface, I do hope to 
have provided some insight into the treasure trove of information that is the 
international system of the Mediterranean and Ancient Near East in Late Antiquity; as 
well as the potential of applying IR-theories to pre-modern history to improve our 
understanding of international relations in a historical context that has remained 
unfamiliar to modern political theorists.  
                                                
87 Buzan, Little and Richards, Logic of Anarchy, p. 27.  
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Appendix: Maps of the Mediterranean – Ancient 
Near East 
Map 1.1 “The Mediterranean in Late Antiquity”, in: G.W. Bowersock, P. Brown and O. 
Grabar, Late Antiquity, A Guide to the Postclassical World (Cambridge, The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University, 1999), x. 
Map 1.2 “The Ancient Near East in Late Antiquity”, in: G.W. Bowersock, P. Brown and O. Grabar, Late 
Antiquity, A Guide to the Postclassical World (Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 
1999), x. 
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Map 2. “The Roman Empire and the barbarian kingdoms around 525”, in: S. Mitchell, A 
History of the Later Roman Empire, AD 284 – 641. (Wiley Blackwell, 2015), p. 135. 
Map 3. “The new Mediterranean empire of Justinian”, in: S. Mitchell, A History of the Later 
Roman Empire, AD 284 – 641. (Wiley Blackwell, 2015), p. 158. 
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